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Psychological team diversity and strategy implementation:  
theoretical considerations and an experimental study 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The overwhelming majority of team or group composition studies are restricted to analyzing the 
link between team demographics and the content of specific strategic choices. We argue that in 
order to make progress in this domain it is now time to broaden the approach by focusing on 
psychological team composition and issues of effective implementation. In addition, we propose 
a more sophisticated theoretical and methodological approach to the use of specific team 
composition measures. We conducted an experimental study in order to explore the potential of 
addressing these major limitations of  past research. Specifically, we hypothesize on and analyze 
the relationship between the psychological composition of management teams (in terms of their 
members' control perceptions) and two aspects of effective strategy implementation: meticulous 
planning and the configuration of consistent action patterns. We find that homogeneous 'internal' 
teams adapt their strategy-making behavior to the requirements of the environment, whereas 
homogeneous 'external' teams do not. As expected, mixed (i.e., heterogeneous) teams 
experienced most problems in effectively implementing their strategies. The findings provide 
support for the potential value of analyzing both psychological composition of decision making 
teams and strategy implementation issues. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of properly 
matching theoretical expectations and measurement methodology in multi-level research. 
 
Key words: Strategy implementation, team composition, locus of control, methodology.  
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Psychological team diversity and strategy implementation:  
theoretical considerations and an experimental study 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The past two decades have shown a surge in popular interest and publications on the functioning and 
alleged importance of teamwork for contemporary organizations (see e.g. Tjosvold, 1991; 
Katzenbach, 1993, 1998). This development was accompanied and partly preceded by many 
academic studies dealing with the consequences of diversity in teams (Milliken and Martins, 1996; 
Maznevski, 1994) . To be sure, studying the effects of group diversity has a long history in social 
psychology, in particular in group dynamics (Lewin, 1948; 1951). Extending this line of research to 
the management realm, Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that as an organization is a reflection of 
its top managers, studying the consequences of differences in the composition of top management 
teams (TMT) is a worthwhile endeavor. Their paper was very influential in the organizational 
sciences domain and it stimulated many research efforts into understanding the relationship between 
team composition, team functioning and organizational outcomes (see Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996; and Van Olffen and Boone, 1998 for a review). The importance of their contribution resides in 
bringing back the individual into the predominantly macro-level organizational theory (Sörensen, 
1999). In addition, as it links characteristics of human beings with organizational outcomes, such as 
strategy and performance, it has the potential to unify the increasingly disparate micro and macro 
ends of the field (Carroll and Harrison, 1998). 
 However, when taking stock of the empirical research inspired by Hambrick and Mason's 
call, one is left with a confusing picture. Except for the consistent negative relationship between 
tenure heterogeneity of team members and turnover (Carroll and Harrison, 1998), hardly any 
generality can be observed concerning the effect of different team compositions on organizational 
outcomes, such as strategy and performance. A review, for instance, of 12 representative team 
composition papers in which 54 relationships were tested shows that 52 % of these test results were 
not significant (van Olffen, 1999). In addition, when significant findings are reported, effect sizes 
tend to be small. These many non-findings can mean two things: (1) management team composition 
does not really make a difference, or (2) methodological limitations of team studies impede finding 
general patterns. We think that before dismissing team composition as an important variable, it is 
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essential to analyze the current methodological practice in team composition research first.  
 The main contribution of the present paper and the view defended here, is that progress can 
be made in the so called 'upper echelons' field by addressing some important methodological 
limitations of past research. We will also illustrate our point by presenting the findings of an 
exploratory experimental study into the relationship between the psychological composition of 
management teams and the construction of firm strategies. In our view there are three major 
limitations of past studies in this tradition1 namely: (1) an overemphasis on explaining strategy 
content at the expense of the micro-level process of strategy implementation (2) an almost exclusive 
focus on demographic characteristics of managers, and (3) an a-theoretical approach as far as the 
aggregation of individual characteristics to meaningful team-level variables is concerned. In order  to 
show whether dealing with these limitations is a fruitful avenue for further research, we performed an 
experiment with managers in a business game setting in which we focus on the following points. 
First, we will explain effective strategy implementation as opposed to differences in the content of 
strategic choices. Second, we will pioneer a kind of within-team variation that has long been called 
for but rarely studied, namely psychological instead of demographic team composition (Milliken and 
Martins, 1996). Specifically, we chose to study team member's locus of control (Rotter, 1966) 
because of its proven relevance in areas that are logically related to aspects of sound implementation. 
Finally, we will argue that the standard methodological practice of computing the mean and some 
kind of variance measure to characterize the composition of teams is seldom justified and in most 
cases inadequate. Instead, we follow Chan’s (1998) recommendation by explicating the theoretical 
underpinnings of using certain elementary composition rules. The purpose of this exercise is to arrive 
at a theoretically based, more meaningful classification of generic team types. 
 In the following section we address these limitations of standard practice in the upper 
echelons research tradition in detail. By doing so we are able to position our empirical contribution, 
designed to illustrate the potential of using new variables, methods and domains of investigation, 
more clearly. Subsequently, we present the theory and hypotheses related to our empirical study. In 
the methods section we will describe the experimental setup we used to test our team hypotheses. 
After presenting the results of our analyses, we discuss the findings. In closing we evaluate this study 
by mentioning limitations and opportunities for future work. 
  
 
1 Note that some of these limitations do not only apply to top management team research but also to team 
composition research in general, as will become clear below. 
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GENERAL BACKGROUND  
Three limitations of previous research 
A first limitation of past team research in management is an almost exclusive focus on differences in 
the demographic composition of teams. The implicit assumption is that managers with certain 
demographic characteristics are rather homogeneous in holding certain attitudes, traits and values 
that presumably lead to a particular behavior. These attitudes and values themselves are, however, 
seldom measured and neither are their relationships with demographics. This practice obscures the 
exact mechanism by which demographics influence behavior and ultimately team functioning and 
organizational outcomes. We suspect that many non-findings in upper echelons studies (see Van 
Olffen & Boone, 1998) are at least partly caused by this use of rather distant proxies like 
demographics for behavior. Thus, a focus on more fundamental behavioral tendencies rooted in 
personality seems warranted because these are more directly linked to behavior and provide a more 
valid measurement of values and attitudes than do demographic variables. In fact, Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) readily acknowledged this crucial point. When they presented their model and called 
for empirical research they made it very clear that “[i]t is doubtful that this research stream can 
progress far without greater attention to relevant literature in related fields, especially psychology and 
social psychology” (Hambrick and Mason, 1984: 203). Their emphasis on observable characteristics 
to start with, was inspired by rather pragmatic reasons like data availability and measurability. 
However, the growing need to use more psychological variables in upper echelons research is 
repeatedly stressed by researchers in the field. For instance, Hambrick et al. (1993: 402) state that 
“[e]ven though psychological factors (...) are of central significance to upper echelons theory, such 
phenomena are rarely studied or measured directly in empirical studies of top executives”. Indeed, 
we know of no empirical management team study to date that has explicitly looked at the 
psychological composition of the team using validated personality inventories. In fact, this seems to 
be a void even in the broader social psychological field of intra team functioning and effectiveness 
(Schruijer and Vansina, 1997; Barrick et al., 1998). Note that this call for studying psychological 
diversity seems particularly important when firm strategies are studied from the perspective of micro-
level actions taken by individuals and teams. As such, it seems a natural and appropriate level of 
analysis for studying strategy construction. 
 In the present paper we focus on the locus of control personality trait, which refers to 
individual differences in a generalized belief in internal versus external control of reinforcement 
(Rotter, 1966). People with an internal locus of control see themselves as active agents. They feel that 
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they are masters of their fates and trust in their capacity to influence the environment. Conversely, 
those with an external locus of control see themselves as relatively passive agents and believe that the 
events in their lives are due to uncontrollable forces. We chose to study this particular trait because it 
indicates fundamental differences between individuals (Boone and De Brabander, 1993). 
Furthermore, control perceptions appear to be very salient in explaining effective management and 
individual managerial actions. Specifically, research into the relationship between Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) locus of control and organizational performance consistently shows that firms led by 
internal CEOs perform better than firms headed by external CEOs, both in the short- as in the long-
run (Miller and Toulouse, 1986a; Boone et al., 1996, 2000). Despite these results it is not yet very 
well understood why CEO locus of control matters so much. 
  It is here that we touch on the second limitation of previous research. Differences in strategic 
choice (i.e., content) tend to be overemphasized as the mediating mechanism between managerial 
characteristics and organizational performance. This occurs at the expense of strategy construction or 
implementation issues. On this, Lewin and Stephens (1994) observe that top management's role in 
shaping strategy has been discussed in the literature, but the CEO's motivation and ability to shape 
organization design as a means to implement strategy and to match the organization design with his 
or her management philosophy and style has been largely overlooked. To advance our understanding, 
future models of  managerial decision making should not only focus on strategy choice but also on 
the processes associated with the effective implementation of these choices. In the case of CEO locus 
of control, Boone et al. (1996) in fact found indirect evidence that what really differentiates internal 
from external CEOs, is the former's ability to implement successfully whatever strategy. This is 
nicely underscored by the following general proposition of Lewin and Stephens (1994: 195) on the 
importance of top management locus of control: “CEOs with internal loci of control feel efficacious 
in controlling outcomes. Therefore, they are likely to believe in the concept of strategy, engage in 
strategic planning, implement the structures and processes for monitoring the environment that 
strategic planning entails, and restructure their organizations to fit the contingencies of their chosen 
strategies”. In short: internals have better implementation skills. In this paper we wish to investigate 
aspects of this general proposition at the team level of analysis. That is, we will analyze how control 
perceptions in teams relate to the accuracy with which strategies are constructed through a process of 
careful planning and the configuration of consistent action patterns. 
 The final limitation is of a methodological nature. Team composition research is multilevel 
research in which data from a lower level, i.e. characteristics of individuals, are used to establish 
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higher level constructs, i.e. team characteristics (Chan, 1998). It is essential to recognize that there 
are many different ways to derive higher level constructs from lower level data. As Barrick et  al. 
(1998: 378) state, "there is not an established theoretical approach for proper aggregation of 
individual characteristics into team level constructs". However, in an insightful paper, Chan (1998) 
proposes a typology of composition models that specifies the functional relationship between 
constructs at different levels of analysis. He also shows that the specification of adequate 
composition models is a critical component of good multilevel research (Chan, 1998). In team 
research, and this is the third limitation, little attention is paid to the theoretical underpinnings of 
using certain elementary composition rules. That is, it is standard practice to aggregate data on 
individual characteristics, such as tenure, by computing the mean and the standard deviation or the 
coefficient of variation. In terms of Chan's typology, this implies that researchers implicitly use the 
additive and dispersion composition models, respectively. In the latter model, the meaning of the 
team construct derives from the dispersion or variance among lower level units and is operationalized 
with measures of within-group variance. In team research, social psychology theory on group 
functioning provides the basic background for hypothesizing on the effects of dispersion. 
Specifically, dispersion measures indicate the extent of heterogeneity among team members which is 
assumed to hamper cognitive and behavioral integration and therefore ultimately team effectiveness 
(Shaw, 1981, McCain et al., 1983, Wagner et al., 1984). The dispersion model has been used with 
success in several studies. For instance, empirical research consistently shows that heterogeneous 
teams with respect to tenure have higher turnover rates (Carroll and Harrison, 1998). 
 On the other hand, when averages are computed of lower-level data, one implicitly uses the 
additive model. In this model the higher level construct is just a summation of the lower level units 
regardless of the variance among these units. Our objection, however, is that the additive model is 
very inadequate for predicting group behavior because, theoretically, effects of the mean can only be 
expected when the dispersion is low. This is because hypotheses on the effect of the team means are 
invariably based on what is known at the individual level of analysis. An example will illustrate our 
point. Consider the following statement: ‘A team with a high average age is unlikely to take risks 
because an old manager is equally unlikely to behave that way’. This type of reasoning, in which 
individual characteristics are directly extrapolated to the team level, is only justified when team 
members resemble each other. Take, for example, the following two teams, one consisting of 
members of age 20, 40 and 60, and the other of 3 members of age 40. Although both teams have the 
same mean, it is clear that theories based on the individual level of analysis can only inform us on the 
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behavior of the second team but not of the first. This inadequate use of the additive composition 
model might explain the many inconsistent findings especially in the case of the effect of the mean of 
different demographic characteristics (Van Olffen, 1999). It is important to note that the problem is 
not solved by statistically controlling for dispersion when testing for the effect of the mean (as often 
happens) because it is the subtle interaction between mean and dispersion that counts. In Chan's 
terminology, the appropriate composition model for testing individual-level theories at the group 
level is the direct consensus model. In this model, aggregation of individual level data is only 
justified when consensus or homogeneity is present. 
 In the present study we will combine the direct consensus and dispersion model. This 
combination allows us to test and unravel the implications of both individual-level personality 
theories applied at the group level (by using the direct consensus model) and of social psychology 
theories of mixed group functioning (by using the dispersion model). For this purpose we distinguish 
three generic team types: two types of relatively homogeneous teams (i.e., internal and external 
teams) and one type, called heterogeneous teams, consisting of both internal and external members. 
By comparing homogeneous teams we can test team predictions based on individual personality 
theory. That is, a homogeneous internal team is likely to behave as an internal individual. 
Conversely, if externals dominate the team it will show more ‘external-like’ behavior. By comparing, 
heterogeneous (or what we call 'mixed') teams with both types of homogeneous teams we can test 
social psychology based hypotheses on the consequences of diversity. In our view, this approach is a 
better way to unravel the effects of different processes and in addition allows one to directly compare 
the relative functioning of different team types.      
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Scattered evidence throughout the strategic management literature suggests that both 
management scholars and practitioners favor the issue of strategy formulation, in terms of both 
the content of and process leading to strategic choice. Much literature is devoted to the study of 
the content and/or ex ante process of strategy formulation; much less literature focuses on the ins 
and outs of the ex post implementation of the selected strategies. As said, this is also the case for 
management team composition research. The relative absence of implementation issues in the 
literature is not in balance with its importance for organizational performance in practice. It is 
widely accepted that several strategies may be viable in the same environment as long as 
managers are able to shape coherent configurations in which strategic choices, structures, systems 
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and processes are carefully aligned (Miles and Snow, 1984; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980). One 
might even conjecture that a superior implementation of a second-best strategy produces higher 
organizational performance than an inferior implementation of the first-best strategy (Boone et 
al., 1996). Given its large potential impact on organizational performance, we chose to focus on 
effective strategy implementation in this study. In addition, we have good reasons to believe that 
the composition of management teams, especially in terms of the locus of control of its members, 
has an important impact on effective strategy implementation. Before presenting our hypotheses, 
it is essential to shortly summarize the vast psychological literature into the behavioral 
consequences of locus of control. 
  This literature shows that internals generally perform better than externals in achievement 
related domains (Lefcourt, 1982; van Olffen, 1999). The reason is that the level of achievement 
basically depends on the extent to which three sets of specific achievement-related behaviors are 
performed (see Figure 1). First, an individual has to understand ‘how the world works’ by 
carefully directing his/her attention and making sense of the overwhelming number of stimuli 
which he/she encounters. Second, (s)he must engage in goal-directed behavior and be persistent 
despite setbacks. Intentions must therefore be translated into planned and consistent goal-directed 
behavior, from which a concerted action pattern results. Third, one has to be flexible enough to 
adapt behavior to the requirements of the situation when this is necessary. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Note that individuals who believe in their own potency to master their environment (i.e., 
‘internals’) are more likely to perform these achievement-related behaviors. In fact, a thorough 
review of the psychological literature (van Olffen, 1999) indeed reveals that internals are more 
inquisitive, are more persistent and goal-directed in achieving valued outcomes and behave less 
rigid than externals (Srull and Karabenick, 1975; Phares, 1976; Lefcourt, 1982). It is clear that 
especially the capacity of internals to act persistent and goal directed is very salient in the realm 
of effective strategy implementation (box II in Figure 1). 
 
Consensus model: homogeneous internal versus homogeneous external teams. 
The above mentioned findings of psychological studies and the very definition of the concept 
locus of control allows us to formulate the general proposition that internals are better straegy 
implementers than externals. It is likely that individuals who believe in their capacity to control 
their environment will be more motivated and persistent in trying to construct and implement a 
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strategy that is believed to lead to success. They will make more conscious choices on how to 
deal with the various contingencies. These choices will be confidently and carefully implemented 
in order to maximize their potential success. Such behavior increases the likelihood of controlling 
the environmental contingencies, which is exactly what internals strive for. Externals, who tend 
to feel like pawns in a complex world, probably consider such efforts to be futile. These 
expectations concerning individual behavior based on personality theory can be extrapolated to 
the team-level under the condition that teams are relatively homogeneous, as explained in the 
previous section. So, homogeneous internal teams will be better strategy implementers than 
homogeneous external teams (in the remainder, the labels internal and external teams are used to 
indicate relatively homogeneous teams).  
We focus on two aspects of effective strategy implementation in this study: planning 
quality and the extent to which strategies are internally and longitudinally consistent. As far as 
planning is concerned, hardly any research has been done into the relationship between locus of 
control and planning in a managerial context. An exception is the research of Miller and 
colleagues who found that internality is associated with the extent of self-reported planning for 
the future (Miller et al., 1982, Miller, 1983; Miller and Toulouse, 1986b). Unfortunately, these 
findings are based on CEO self-report assessments. This may have inflated the results due to 
common method variance (see Boone and De Brabander, 1997). Therefore, in the present study 
we wish to go beyond the mere subjective self-report measurement of planning aspects by readily 
observing the objective outcomes of effective planning activity. In addition, we focus on teams 
instead of single managers. As planning can be seen as a concerted effort to simultaneously 
optimize and control several aspects of a firm's functioning, internal teams may be expected to 
outperform external teams for two reasons. The first reason is simply that they believe and 
engage in planning more (as explained above). An additional reason is that internals are better 
able to cognitively process and integrate the different cues in a complex planning problem 
(Phares, 1976). In particular, internals are more sensitive to potentially relevant cues and crucial 
contingencies in ambiguous situations than externals. They are also better at retaining and 
integrating acquired information and generally seem to deal with tasks in a more organized 
fashion (Wolk and Ducette, 1974). This would qualify them better for performing complex tasks 
(Spector, 1982) like the planning task under study. Thus, based on personality theory the 
following hypothesis on the team level can be formulated with respect to planning quality: 
Hypothesis 1a:  The planning quality of homogeneous internal teams will be higher than 
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that of homogeneous external teams. 
As internals are more likely to follow a planned course of action, we also expect to observe 
differences in the extent to which their actions are consistent, i.e. coordinated at each moment in 
and across time. Two types of strategic action consistency can therefore be distinguished: (1) the 
extent to which at a given moment in time choices are coordinated and integrated to form a 
logical, coherent pattern (coherence) and (2) the extent to which the choices are consistent over 
time (persistence). We predict internal teams to design more coherent strategies than external 
teams. This is because, as stated before, the whole concept of strategy as a consciously 
engineered action pattern to reach a goal has more appeal to internals than it has to externals (van 
Olffen, 1999). The latter will tend to expect little from this kind of coordination across actions 
and are thus more likely to show more incoherent and fragmented action patterns. Moreover, as 
in the case of planning, this coordination across actions requires an organized mode of attention, 
which internals possess more than externals (Lefcourt et al., 1968; Wolk and DuCette, 1974). For 
these reasons we expect internal teams to show greater coherence in their competitive repertoire 
(i.e., in their actions) than external teams. 
Hypothesis 1b: Homogeneous internal teams will show greater coherence among actions 
than homogeneous external teams. 
Internal teams may be expected to show more consistency in their actions over time as well. 
Based on their analysis of the situation and their motivated choice for a certain course, internals 
will show more (initial) commitment or persistence to their chosen competitive posture than 
externals. The reasonableness of this expectation is reflected in psychological studies showing 
internals’ higher persistence in tasks even when confronted with intermediate setbacks (Srull and 
Karabenick, 1975; Karabenick and Srull, 1978). Externals will tend to be more volatile and 
whimsical, showing difficulty to hold on to a chosen course. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1c: Homogeneous internal teams will show more action persistence than 
homogenous external teams. 
 
 
Dispersion model: mixed versus non-mixed teams. 
To hypothesize on differences between mixed (heterogeneous)  and non-mixed (homogeneous 
 12 
 
internal and external) teams, we have to draw from the group dynamics literature (Shaw, 1981; 
Forsyth, 1990). This strand of research suggests that people differing on important attributes like 
age, tenure or personality may hold different frames of reference that hinder communication and 
cognitive and behavioral integration (McCain et al., 1983; Wagner et al., 1984; Zenger and 
Lawerence, 1989). These so-called process losses, in turn, increase the likelihood that conflicts, 
turnover (Wagner et al., 1984) and power struggles (Pfeffer, 1983) occur, attracting attention 
away from the immediate tasks of the group. The operational efficiency of diverse teams in 
performing their tasks is then threatened because much time and energy are required to overcome 
communication barriers and power games. To summarize, diversity has some clear drawbacks in 
relation to intra-group functioning. In general, it is clear that the implementation task of planning 
and aligning various and often contradictory elements of a company seems especially delicate in 
this respect. Applied to our study, we thus expect that the planning quality of mixed teams will be 
hampered by poor intra-group functioning. 
Hypothesis 2a:  The planning quality of mixed teams will be lower than that of non-mixed 
teams. 
The argument against mixed teams on action coherence is similar as that discussed with planning 
quality above. Because of problems of achieving cognitive and behavioral integration, it is logical 
to expect that mixed teams will experience difficulties in forming a coherent set of behavior. 
Hypothesis 2b: The coherence among actions of mixed teams will be lower than that of 
non-mixed teams. 
Heightened misunderstanding and disagreement within mixed teams will tend to impede their 
ability to hold on to their strategic course of action as well. 
Hypothesis 2c: The action persistence of mixed teams will be lower than that of non-
mixed teams. 
 
Qualification: interaction with environmental dynamism. 
Finally, we wish to introduce an important moderating variable which is the level of 
environmental dynamism. We expect that the differences between the three generic team types 
will be more pronounced in dynamic than in stable environments. This prediction is consistent 
with both the consensus and the dispersion model. First, it follows from personality theory that 
personality traits, including locus of control, are much more important to predict behavior in 
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weak versus strong situations (Weiss and Adler, 1984; Rotter, 1975). This is because in weak 
situations, which are characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity, there is latitude for 
interpretation of what happens in the individual’s environment. Conversely, in strong situations, 
such as stable environments, clear guidelines for ‘proper’ behavior exist and therefore individual 
differences loose their power in predicting behavior (Miller and Toulouse, 1986b). Second, we 
also think that the problem of mixed teams to achieve cognitive and behavioral integration will be 
larger in dynamic as opposed to stable environments. Especially in uncertain and ambiguous 
environments in which no clear-cut answers exist, different individuals will tend to have different 
perceptions and opinions. This in turn raises the likelihood of conflict and communication 
barriers, reducing effective planning and consistent strategic behavior. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The differences between the team types specified in hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 
2a, 2b, 2c will be larger in dynamic than in stable environments. 
 
METHOD 
Experimental setting 
The subjects of this study are participants of a large-scale management game played by 167 
teams throughout Europe. The game is organized yearly by a Dutch commercial enterprise and is 
used by firms to train young managers as part of their management development programs. 
Because participating is all but cheap (about 5000 Dutch guilders, besides time consumption), 
firms are likely to select employees who will seriously play the game. As a result, the selected 
managers are probably highly motivated to satisfy the objectives of their employers, represented 
by their direct supervisors. Basically, this international management game is a realistic simulation 
of complex real-world competition. That is, each team of participants has to run a firm that faces 
multi-faceted competition in a number of markets. Here, we restrict the discussion of the game’s 
nature to briefly outlining a number of the key aspects. [Details, can be found in the game’s 
manual (MCC, 1993).] 
The business environment created in the game is a highly realistic simulation of actual 
market conditions by reflecting both autonomous and induced market developments. The latter 
derive from the specific impact of firms’ behavior on industry competition. Teams have to decide 
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on strategy issues that cover all important business areas such as (investment in) production 
(capacity and quality), marketing (pricing, advertising and sales promotion), finance (capital 
budgeting), personnel (hiring, quality and layoff), intelligence and R&D. Additionally, teams are 
allowed to cooperate with other firms in the industry so as to improve product quality and/or 
process efficiency. In each decision period, the choices have to be filled out on a special decision 
form that contains a total of over 30 decision categories (see Appendix A). 
Teams compete in groups of five, a group being the game equivalent of an industry. This 
is where actual competition - with the other four industry members - takes place. The game is 
played in two rounds, I and II: the first round consists of six and the second round of seven so-
called decision periods, 1 to 6/7. Each decision period lasts two weeks. At the end of each two-
week period, teams have to fax the aforementioned decision form to the game’s management 
team, specifying their decisions for the upcoming period. After processing the decisions of the 
five competing companies, game management provides a summary of a team’s results for the 
current period. This feedback involves a large range of relevant areas, including market shares, 
profit rates, and financial and stock positions. By the end of the six decision periods of round I, 
teams are ranked according to their so-called criterion score, being a composite measure of 
market share, profit and the projected sustainability of the company's results after the last playing 
period. This score therefore proxies short as well as long-run firm performance. On the basis of 
this ranking new groups (industries) of five teams are formed, by clustering strong and weak 
teams, to play round II. In doing so, teams compete against opponents of comparable strength in 
the second part of the game. After the end of the seven decision periods in round II, the top 
fifteen teams are invited to appear in the finals. This involves an intensive management game of 
one day, played at a conference center in The Netherlands. The winners are awarded a one-week 
business trip to Japan.  
The fictive manufacturing company that each team manages, produces three different 
unspecified products, which are to be sold in three different markets (A, B and C, respectively). 
Market A, for product 1, consists of a home market and an export market. Initial demand in 
market A (home and export) is about half market B’s level. In the third period, demand for a new 
product, to be supplied to market C, starts to emerge. Initially, demand in this third market is low: 
about 25 and 13 percent of the initial demand levels in market A and B, respectively. Products 
produced for market B can also be dumped in a so-called ‘white market’ at a fixed price. 
Dumping, however, will generate lower demand for product B in the official market in the 
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subsequent period. At the beginning of the two rounds, all five teams in an industry have equal 
market shares in market A and B (that is, 20%). The share they obtain in the new product market 
C in period 3, depends on their second-period investment in preparing third-period market entry. 
Key market characteristics are summarized in Appendix B. 
By paying for market research, firms (teams) can gain insight into the development of 
market demand for their products. Demand development in all markets generally follows a 
smooth trend over time. In each period, however, external shocks can create disturbances in 
demand. Teams are given notice of these shocks in advance. Firm’s marketing efforts influence 
demand development for their product: for example, the average price level and total advertising 
outlays have a direct impact on demand in the current period and a limited lagged demand effect 
in the subsequent period. Also, credit facilities and investments in product improvement 
influence demand for a firm’s products in later periods. 
Because the game and the associated procedures are complex, the chances for 
misunderstanding by contestants were minimized by providing an elaborate manual, an 
information desk (reachable by telephone) and three short practicing rounds before the actual 
game started. We decided to restrict the analysis to the first-round game for two reasons. First, 
the re-composition of industries at the beginning of round II limits the opportunities to evaluate a 
team’s performance over the whole game. Second, and more importantly, teams are not randomly 
assigned to industries in round II, which makes it impossible to disentangle team from industry 
effects. Specifically, each focal team is not competing against the same 'average' team in round II, 
implying that these data cannot be used to make sensible estimates of outcome differences 
between teams. 
Data collection and sample characteristics 
Data were collected through two routes. First, we received all team-level decisions and results 
from game management. Second, we mailed questionnaires to all team captains who agreed to 
distribute them among team members. The first questionnaire, A, consists of two parts. The first 
part contained questions relating to the members’ backgrounds in terms of age, education, tenure, 
former work experience, team member familiarity and functional specialty. In the second part a 
validated psychological test measuring locus of control (Rotter, 1966) was administered. Three 
weeks after the first mailing, non-responding teams were mailed reminders and new 
questionnaires A. Finally, four weeks later captains of non-responding teams were contacted by 
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phone. Three months after starting the game, team members were asked to individually fill out a 
questionnaire B regarding group processes such as decision rules, leadership behavior and 
relative participation. 
In the end, 58 ‘complete’ teams, out of the 167 that participated in the 1994 edition of the 
game (35.7%), returned both questionnaires. A ‘complete’ team in our sample implies that all 
team members returned both questionnaires A and B. In sum, these teams consisted of 273 
individuals. Based upon the results of the participation questions in questionnaire B, we removed 
from our sample all individuals that had not actually participated according to at least two fellow 
team members: consequently, 21 cases were dropped, resulting in an effective sample of 252 
individuals. Analysis of variance revealed that the sample is not significantly different from non-
sampled teams on any of the average firm performance indicators i.e., market share, profit and 
sustainability (at p < .10). 
As the game originated in the Netherlands, most teams in our sample are Dutch. In fact, in 
the 1994 edition of the game 88% of the total number of teams was Dutch, the remainder coming 
from such diverse countries as Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia and Switzerland. 
Half of the respondents is employed in the service sector, predominantly professional business 
consulting or audit firms. With regard to team member characteristics, the sample includes (i) 
only a small minority of females (13.3%), (ii) about 40% of team members with a university 
degree and (iii) members with an average age of about 33, ranging from 20 to 55. 
Measures and variables 
Locus of control 
Individual control perceptions were measured with a Dutch translation of the well-known and 
widely used Rotter scale (Rotter, 1966). It contains 37 forced-choice items, 23 of those items 
measuring control expectancies and 14 being filler items. Respondents have to choose between 
an internal and an external control alternative. The following pair of statements provides an 
example: “Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me” 
(external control alternative) and “It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an 
important role in my life” (internal control alternative). The total so-called 'Rotter score' is 
obtained by summing the number of external control alternatives chosen (with a minimum of 0 
and a maximum of 23). As a result a high Rotter score corresponds to an external locus of 
control; a low score indicates an internal locus of control. The translated scale we used contains 
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14 filler items to make the purpose of the test more obscure. The reliability and validity of this 
Dutch translation were repeatedly demonstrated (Boone et al., 1990; Boone, 1992; Boone and De 
Brabander, 1993; De Brabander et al., 1992). Non Dutch-speaking teams received a version that 
was translated in English and checked by native speakers. Coefficient alpha of the scale in our 
sample was .70, which concurs with internal consistencies reported by Rotter (1966) and 
Robinson and Shaver (1973). Alpha’s value is well above the lower limits of acceptability 
(Nunnally, 1978).  
Team composition 
To capture the team’s composition we followed a method quite different from the one usually 
employed in team studies. Conventionally, the arithmetic mean of a variable within a team is 
employed to characterize a team on a certain trait (e.g., age, tenure etc.) In addition, to assess 
whether a team is homogeneous or heterogeneous on that trait, the standard deviation or the 
coefficient of variation is calculated. As explained in Section 2, we think that these methods are 
inappropriate because the same mean may hide different standard deviations, and vice versa. So, 
teams with the same mean or standard deviation may be composed quite differently. For instance, 
teams with three relatively internal members (e.g., 3 times Rotter score 5) and one external 
outlier (e.g., Rotter score 15) yield an identical mean as teams with more evenly distributed 
Rotter scores (e.g., 2, 6, 11, 11). Yet, conceptually, these teams are very different. Only the 
former team could truly be labeled 'internal' in the spirit of our hypotheses and their underlying 
theories, whereas the latter is more heterogeneously composed. To arrive at a team classification 
that better fits with our purposes of measuring 'true' team internality (or externality) and which 
distinguishes generic team types unambiguously, we proceeded as follows. First, all individuals 
were classified as being internal or external based on their Rotter scores being either below or 
above the sample median of 10. Second, team composition was evaluated by looking at the 
percentage of internals on the team. Teams characterized by more than 60 percent of their 
members being internals were classified as internal teams. Similarly, teams with less than 40 
percent being internal are considered to be external teams. Finally, teams having a relatively 
balanced number of internals and externals were designated as mixed teams (i.e., all other teams). 
In doing so, we assured relative homogeneity of team members in the internal and external teams 
in a way that fits with the expected effects as stated in the hypotheses. It also yields relatively 
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balanced subgroup counts appropriate for analyses.2 This procedure leads to the creation of 23 
internal teams, 17 external teams and 18 mixed teams. 
Planning quality. 
Planning can be conceived of as an activity to simultaneously optimize and control different 
aspects of the environment in order to reach a goal. The planning activity of teams itself is 
unobservable in our research design. We can, however, measure its effectiveness, that is, the 
resulting quality of planning, which is adequate for our purpose. As shown in Appendix C, four 
important planning domains can be distinguished in the game: capacity planning (machines and 
personnel), input-output planning (raw material and end product stocks and production levels), 
sales planning and financial or liquidity planning. Both between and within these domains, the 
game consists of several interrelated processes that must be carefully monitored and planned to 
arrive at cost effective operations. It is clear that the planning quality of a team is high when it 
manages to effectively align processes in several domains simultaneously. We therefore 
developed an omnibus planning quality measure which is composed of seven planning 
effectiveness measures (A to G) related to the four central planning domains of the game. These 
seven effectiveness measures are described below. 
1. Capacity planning: personnel and machines utilization. 
In order to get most productivity out of investments in machines and personnel, it is important to 
minimize idle production capacity. The utilization of personnel and machine capacity was 
measured as the fraction of the total installed capacity that was used in each period to produce 
that period's production run i.e., (Total machines (personnel) capacity used) / (Total machine 
(personnel) capacity installed). This measure was averaged over the six playing periods. If in any 
period the volume of the intended production run is well matched to the available production 
capacity, capacity utilization is high and the best use is made of these resources. Thus capacity 
utilization of personnel (A) and machines (B) proxies the quality of capacity planning. If teams 
want to start a too high production volume, which cannot be produced with the available 
production capacity, game management interferes and decreases the volume of the intended 
production run proportionally until they fall within available capacity limits.3 As this interference 
 
2 We also used a more stringent cutoff point 30/70. This cutoff point yielded 14 internal, 11 external and 33 mixed 
teams. The 40/60 classification we used is clearly more balanced than this alternative. Note that the chosen cutoff 
point does not substantially change the results of the analyses reported here (see also footnote 8 for details). 
3 The same thing happens when insufficient raw materials are available. 
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represents an instance of bad planning on the part of the team as well, we measured the average 
percentage of forced downward production adjustment i.e., ((Volume of forced production 
adjustment) / (Total planned production volume) * 100) as a third indicator (C) of (bad) planning 
in this domain. 
2. Input-output planning: raw material and end product stock increases.  
The level of raw material stock at the end of period t is determined (mainly) by the stock at the 
end of t-1 and the difference between raw materials inflow and outflow during period t. Raw 
materials flow in at the start of t when the raw material orders placed at t-1 are received. Raw 
materials flow out, on the other hand, as they are used in producing period t's production run. 
Similarly, the level of the end product stock at the end of t is determined by the end level of t-1 
plus the balance between the inflow and outflow of end products during t. End products flow in 
as the production run of  t-1 is delivered by the production department or when externally 
manufactured end products ordered in t-1 are delivered. Outflow of end products is driven by the 
sales in t. The difficulty in managing both raw material and end product stock levels therefore lies 
in the planning of production, ordering and sales both in volumes and across time. As to the 
levels of these stocks, teams may prefer to set them lower or higher, possibly reflecting the 
amount of safety they want to build in. However, strong and consistently rising stocks (D and E) 
are an indication of faulty planning as either production or sales volumes were not properly 
matched. We therefore summed the volumes of stock rises that occurred between periods and 
used this total as an inverse indicator of planning quality.4  
3. Sales planning: no-sales. 
Sales planning involves the matching of production to stock and the demand for the product  
which is importantly influenced by the firm's marketing outlays. The question here is whether the 
firm is capable of serving the market in large enough quantities. If more units are produced than 
can be sold, stocks will (ceteris paribus) rise. This aspect of sales planning is therefore already 
captured in the above mentioned measure E. On the other hand, if firms cannot satisfy demand 
(i.e., if demand is higher than supply) so-called 'no-sales' occur. This is caused by the fact that 
either the firm has planned badly against the trend in generic demand or because its own relative 
marketing efforts have generated more specific demand than can be supplied to the market, that 
 
4 Stock-outs would be an alternative measure, but their effects are already captured elsewhere: possessing too few raw 
materials leads to game management interference by reducing teams' planned production levels (= measure C); end-
product shortage leads to no-sales (=measure F; see under 3). 
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is: marketing and production are badly matched. In either case the total volume of no-sales (F) 
over all periods can serve as a reverse indicator of the quality of these planning efforts. 
4. Financial planning: cash shortage. 
In order to pay current expenses, enough cash must be generated and secured. The amount of 
cash that firms hold can be taken as a safety stock just like the aforementioned end products and 
raw materials. If careful planning of the cash balance fails, however, firms may end up with a 
deficit (G). In case this happens they have to borrow more money (i.e., get a so-called additional 
credit) at a higher interest rate or (in case the deficit is too large) they have to request suspension 
of payment. If they had anticipated the shortage they might have decided to borrow more in the 
preceding period. In any case, the total amount of cash shortage during the game inversely 
indicates the quality of liquidity planning. We measured this by calculating a team's cash position 
at the end of each period before the granting of additional credits. All cash deficits that occurred 
during the game are then summed to obtain our (inverse) measure of liquidity planning quality  
G. 
 The omnibus planning quality measure (H) was computed by first reverse coding C to G 
to positively indicate planning quality and subsequently summing the standardized values of each 
of the seven planning effectiveness indicators. Note that this indicator H is an additive measure of 
planning quality which implies that reliability measures, such as Cronbach alpha, do not apply 
(see also Rotter, 1975).  
Action consistency 
Two types of consistency are mentioned in the hypotheses. First is the consistency between 
different actions at a given point in time, which we called action coherence. Second is the 
consistency of certain chosen postures over time; called action persistence. Operationalization of 
both types of action consistency will be described subsequently. 
In determining action coherence, the use of a normative framework is inevitable. We 
tried, however, to remain as close as possible to quasi-objective common sense by distinguishing 
strategies on a single strategic continuum running from an emphasis on low cost to an emphasis 
on high value added. These extremes are defined as follows: 
Low cost:   Low prices with investments in cost reduction and a low emphasis on 
marketing expenses. 
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High value added:  Investments in marketing expenses sustained by high prices and a low 
emphasis on cost reductions. 
Five variables were used to measure these strategic orientations: price level, promotion 
expenditures, product quality R&D expenses, length of credit facilities granted to clients and 
efficiency R&D expenses. Investments in efficiency lower variable cost and raw material usage 
per unit of production. Strategies take effect only in comparison with those of other competitors 
(i.e., other teams) in the industry. Therefore, in each period we measured the within-industry rank 
(1 to 5) of a team on each of these variables. A team scoring highest on a variable receives the 
highest rank: 1, a team scoring lowest receives the lowest5 rank i.e., 5. This means that a team 
following a high value added strategy should on average rank high (i.e., be either first or second) 
on price, promotion, quality and credit facilities, but low on efficiency expenses. A typical low-
cost strategy would result in high ranks for efficiency outlays, but low ranks for price, credit 
facilities, promotion and quality. An example of the ranks associated typically with either a low 
cost or a high value added strategy are given in Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
As said, we are not interested in the specific strategy that was followed, but in the consistency of 
the five action levels. It is clear that in coherent strategies the ranks of all variables, with the 
efficiency rank reverse coded, should be roughly identical. So, the sum of the absolute rank 
differences between the five variables constitutes an inverse measure of how coherent the actions 
are. To obtain a positive measure of consistency, we subtracted the summed rank differences 
from their theoretical maximum of 24. Formally, our action consistency measure is as follows: 
         4     5 
 Action coherence = 24 -  ∑   ∑ | R i - R j | 
       i=1  j=i+1 
In Table 1 we provide examples of the calculation of these measures for different teams. The 
action coherence measure was calculated in each period for every market separately. The 
coherence scores were then averaged over time to obtain mean action coherence on home market 
1, export market 1, market 2 and market 3 (from period 3 onwards). Finally, an overall action 
coherence score was calculated by averaging the coherence scores on all four markets. 
 
5 Note that we use the term 'high rank' do denote a low rank figure! This may cause some confusion, but, as will 
become clear shortly, the specific coding order of ranks is of no importance to our ultimate purpose with this 
measure. 
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Action persistence was operationalized as the stability in the rank of an action level over 
time. To assess this, for each market the standard deviation of ranks in period 1 to 6 was 
calculated for the level of prices, promotion, efficiency, product quality, sales group employment 
and credit facility granted. Because the standard deviation of ranks is in fact a measure of 
variability, all standard deviations were multiplied by -1 to obtain a measure that correlates 
positively with persistence. Next, these standard deviations were averaged over the four markets 
to obtain mean action persistence measures for every strategic action. These six action 
persistence measures were then again averaged to obtain an overall temporal consistency or 
action persistence measure. Thus, actions are considered to be persistent if, over time, teams keep 
occupying the same position on a certain action variable within their industry, that is: if rank 
variations are low. The overall coherence and persistence measures too are regarded as additive 
measures so that reliability estimates do not apply. 
Environmental dynamism 
The relevant competitive environment in which teams find themselves is their industry of five 
firms. Environmental dynamism must therefore be calculated at this industry level. This was done 
by looking at movements in teams' relative market positions and their pricing behavior. In this 
way we operationalized dynamism not only by referral to what teams experience (changing share 
positions) but also to an important aspect of what they and their competitors do to create such 
shifts, i.e., changing prices. Note that these changes in prices and market positions also breed the 
kind of uncertainty regarding the future that is inherent in dynamic environments. Our proxy of 
environmental dynamism was thus based on two measures: one related to market-share shifts over 
time and another measuring price-level turbulence. Following Murray (1989), we estimated 
dynamism in each market i within an industry by taking the average of inter-period variabilities 
in individual firm j’s shares (DMSi) and prices (DPRi). Formally, this is, for each market, 
 5 
DMSi =    1/5  ∑   σ(MSi)j      [Average five-firm market share variation in market i] 
   j=1 
and 
  
5 
DPRi =    1/5   ∑    σ(PRi)j,   [Average five-firm price variation in market i] 
   j=1 
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with σ(MSi)j and σ(PRi)j being the standard deviation of firm j’s market shares and price level in 
market i over periods 1 to 6, respectively. Next, we obtained overall industry dynamism scores in 
market shares and price levels by computing the average of DMSi and DPRi over the markets. We 
performed a factor analysis on these two averages (DMS and DPR) in order to obtain a robust 
composite measure of industry dynamism. This produced a single-factor solution explaining 87 
percent of total variance. The factor scores were split at the median to distinguish stable from 
dynamic industries. Thus, dynamic environments (i.e., industries) are characterized by uncertain 
and therefore unpredictable price-level fluctuations accompanied by large shifts in market share 
positions. The opposite holds for stable industries. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports total sample descriptives of effective strategy implementation measures. 
Breakdowns per team type and environmental conditions are shown in Table 3. Finally, Table 4 
shows the results of ANOVAs with team type and environmental dynamism as factors and 
contrast analyses based on the means reported in Table 3. Note that, for the sake of parsimony, 
we only report on the overall measures of planning quality and action consistency. Separate 
analyses on the components of these overall measures, however, are almost identical and 
available from the authors upon request. 
INSERT TABLES 2, 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
The ANOVA results reveal a very significant main effect and interaction effect (team type * 
environmental dynamism) on the overall planning quality measure (see upper part of Table 4). The 
other models with action coherence and persistence as the dependent variable show no significant 
main effects. However, the interaction effect is significant in both cases. Taken together these 
findings show that team composition in terms of locus of control of its member does matter and that 
its effect depends on the level of environmental dynamism. To test whether the differences between 
the team types follow our expectations as formulated in the hypotheses we computed appropriate 
contrasts between the different team types. These are reported in the lower part of Table 4. 
 
Consensus model: homogeneous internal versus homogeneous external teams 
We predicted that internal teams would achieve a higher planning quality, action coherence and 
persistence than external teams (Hypotheses 1a, b and c) especially in dynamic environments 
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(Hypothesis 3). This implies that we expect to observe qualitatively the same but larger differences 
between internal and external teams in dynamic as opposed to stable environments (i.e., monotonic 
interactions). As far as planning quality is concerned we see that internal teams on average rank first 
(column 3 of Table 3), suggesting that internal teams generally plan best. However, this difference 
(.07) is not significant. Further analysis reveals that the expected difference only shows up in 
dynamic environments. That is, internal teams significantly plan better than external teams in 
dynamic environments (contrast = 2.15, p < .05). However, the difference is marginally significant in 
the opposite direction in stable environments (contrast = -2.29, p < .10). Thus, in stable environments 
external teams seem to take the lead, which is not as predicted. This non-monotonic interaction is 
significant as shown by the interaction contrast reported in Table 4 (contrast = 4.44, p < .05).   
 The pattern of findings relating to the other two dependent variables (action coherence and 
persistence) resemble each other and are therefore discussed together. That is, in both cases we do 
not find a significant main effect. The action coherence and persistence of internal teams is not 
generally higher than that of external teams. As a result Hypotheses 1b and c are not confirmed. We 
do, however, find interesting interaction effects. In stable environments, the action coherence and 
persistence of internal teams is significantly higher than that of external teams [contrasts are 1.72 (p < 
.10) and .14 (p < .05) for coherence and persistence, respectively]. In dynamic environments, the 
opposite holds. That is, external teams now show highest action coherence (contrast = -2.29, p < .05) 
and action persistence (contrast = -.01, ns). This switch in position in stable versus dynamic 
environments produces significant interaction contrasts (-4.01, p < .01 for coherence; -.15, p < .05 for 
persistence). Of course, these significant interaction contrasts do not provide evidence for a 
monotonic interaction of the kind predicted in Hypothesis 3, on the contrary. It appears that internal 
teams are more coherent and persistent in stable environments as opposed to dynamic environments; 
whereas exactly the opposite applies for external teams: they are less coherent and persistent in stable 
than in dynamic environments. We will return to this interesting finding in our discussion. 
 To summarize, we did not find supportive evidence for the simple, monotonic differences we 
predicted between internal and external teams on planning quality, action coherence and persistence. 
The interactions instead appeared to be non-monotonic, going against Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c and the 
qualification specified in Hypothesis 3. Apparently, the significant differences between internal and 
external teams crucially depend on the extent of environmental dynamism in a complex way. 
Possible explanations are offered in the discussion section. 
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Dispersion model: mixed versus non-mixed teams   
When comparing mixed versus non-mixed teams the findings are much more in line with our 
expectations, at least as far as planning quality and action coherence is concerned. That is, mixed 
teams take the lowest planning quality position both in stable as in dynamic environments [contrasts 
are 1.60 (p < .10) and 7.48 (p < .05) in stable and dynamic environments, respectively]. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 3, this difference appears to be significantly larger in dynamic environments 
(interaction contrast = 5.88, p < .01). Similarly, mixed teams compared to their non-mixed 
counterparts show lower action coherence in dynamic environments (contrast = 1.77, p < .05). The 
difference, however, is not significant in stable environments, producing a marginally significant 
interaction contrast (contrast = 1.82, p < .10). Taken together, these findings are fully in line with 
Hypothesis 2a and provide partial support for Hypothesis 2b, i.e., as far as the results in dynamic 
environments are concerned. Hypothesis 2c must be rejected as no significant differences could be 
observed between mixed and non-mixed teams in both stable as dynamic environments. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We envisioned the following pattern of findings at the onset of the present study. Strategy 
implementation effectiveness  (planning quality, action coherence and persistence) would be highest 
for internal teams followed by external teams and mixed teams in that order. We expected these 
differences between the three team types to become larger with increasing environmental dynamism. 
Although we found many significant differences in the present study, the pattern appeared to be 
much more complicated than we originally predicted and many of the interactions were non-
monotonic instead of monotonic. Only the behavior of mixed teams appeared to be at least in line 
with the spirit of our hypotheses. We indeed found evidence supporting the idea that mixed teams, 
presumably due to problems of achieving cognitive and behavioral integration, encounter difficulties 
in effective strategy implementation, especially in dynamic environments. Specifically, the planning 
quality of mixed teams was very poor compared to the other team types and they were the least able 
to design coherent strategies in dynamic environments. 
 When comparing internal with external teams, however, many significant but unexpected 
complex findings emerged which require some tentative ex post explanations. Recall that we mainly 
based our hypotheses on evidence reported in the psychological literature showing that internals are 
more goal-directed and persistent than externals (see box 2 of Figure 1). Maybe we overemphasized 
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this difference between internals and externals at the expense of another one, i.e., the capacity of 
internals to adapt their behavior to the requirements of the environment (as shown in box 3 of Figure 
1). Indeed, research has consistently shown that internals are much more sensitive and responsive to 
the environmental contingencies ruling success and failure (Lefcourt, 1982, van Olffen, 1999). If we 
look again at our findings through this lens, they do make sense. 
 The high (low) planning quality of internal teams (external teams) in dynamic but not in 
stable environments might follow from differences in the saliency of planning in different 
environments. Maybe internal teams are more motivated to plan carefully in dynamic environments 
because they then readily recognize the need for simultaneous attention to the different planning 
factors in such circumstances. Conversely, when many changes in the environment occur, the 
pessimistic view of external teams on the controllability of developments may be self-fulfilling as 
they let control slip. The idea that planning is more crucial to performance in dynamic environments 
is reflected in the fact that the correlation between teams' profitability and their overall planning 
quality in dynamic environments (.74, p < .000) is significantly higher (at p < .05)6 than it is in stable 
environments (.44, p < .05). Given these differences, internal teams' behavior may be considered 
more appropriate or adapted than that of externals: when  planning efforts are most needed, internal 
teams engage in it more and external teams less. 
 Concerning action coherence and persistence we found that internal teams were the most 
coherent and persistent team type in stable environments. In dynamic environments, external teams 
are much more coherent and all team types are equally persistent. Interestingly, coherence and 
persistence to a lesser extent is higher in dynamic than in stable environments among external teams. 
Precisely the opposite is true for internal teams. The explanation for this unexpected pattern of 
findings may again be found in a similar adaptation argument as we made for planning quality. When 
the environment is stable and predictable, policies can be configured rather strictly, whereas more 
dynamic circumstances may warrant partial adjustments on several policy aspects that render 
them less consistent but better suited for the prevailing circumstances. Maybe internal teams are 
more prone to show this kind of adaptive behavior than external teams and they do indeed seem 
to follow such an adaptive pattern of behavior, that is: they are most consistent in stable 
environments and considerably less so in dynamic environments. External teams show the 
opposite maladapted behavior: they get more coherent and persistent in dynamic as opposed to 
stable environments. Strict policies like the ones externals follow in dynamic environments may 
 
6 Fisher’s r to z transformation is used for testing differences between correlations (see Cohen and Cohen, 1983: 
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indicate a certain flight into rigidity, a withdrawal into strictness as a primitive defense against 
the need for changes that go against the ‘wisdom’ of a consistently configured policy. 
Unfortunately, this theoretical explanation is not reflected in the payoff of consistent behavior in 
the game. The overall correlations of action coherence and action persistence with profitability in 
the game are -.14 (ns) and -.12 (ns). So no overall relationship exists between consistent policies 
and profitability. The correlations in stable environments are -.28 (ns) and -.08 (ns) and in 
dynamic environments -.08 (ns) and -.16 (ns), respectively. We can therefore only conclude that 
although teams do seem to adjust in ways that are, at least intuitively, sensible and in accordance 
to their psychological make-up, this does not in fact pay off in our particular experimental 
research setting. 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH            
     
The purpose of the present study was to extent the boundaries of  TMT composition research by 
exploring the explanatory power of using new variables, methods and domains of investigation. We 
found that the locus of control composition of management teams, in interaction with environmental 
dynamism, explained a substantial part of the variance of three important variables in the realm of 
effective strategy implementation, i.e., planning quality (36%), action coherence (17%) and action 
persistence (18%) in an experimental business game setting. As the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating, we think that the relatively large R-squares of the models presented in this paper underscore 
the potential of our approach.7 However, our findings together with the limitations of the present 
study also point to three more specific important avenues for further research. 
 First, our research made clear that differences between teams with respect to its locus of 
control make-up translate into differences in the construction of strategies, but mainly, and often 
only, in interaction with environmental dynamism. Many of the aspects of effective implementation 
we analysed yielded significant and interpretable findings.8  This underscores the validity of the locus 
of control trait as a determinant of (pro)active involvement in complex situations as it becomes 
53-55). 
7 This point is all the more clear when we compare these results to those of analyses applying the 'conventional' 
approach (i.e., using the mean, while controlling for variance). Regression analyses show that mean locus of control 
plus its interaction with the dynamism factor explains only 3%, 4% and 10% of variance in planning quality, action 
coherence and action persistence, respectively. None of these effects reaches significance.   
8 We checked the robustness of the interaction effects using the alternative cutoff point 30/70 (as mentioned in 
footnote 1). Our results are generally confirmed in this analysis. Only in case of persistence the 30-70 classification 
produced a weaker (insignificant) interaction result. 
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manifest in planning and configuring consistent actions. However, several results appeared to be 
much more complex than predicted and forced us to propose a post hoc explanation for the 
regularities observed in the data. Specifically, an important hidden theme behind many of the results 
we encountered seems to be related to the adaptive capacity of internal teams. That is, internal teams' 
actions seem to be tailored to the situation they find themselves in. They plan when planning is most 
crucial and they define strict and looser strategies according to environmental pressures. External 
teams, on the other hand, do seem to follow purposive strategies, but often lack appropriateness. 
Maybe this is the ultimate reason why we observed that the profitability and market share of internal 
teams in the present game was much larger than the other team types, especially in dynamic 
environments (see Boone et al., 1998). Important for team research is that the superior performance 
of internal teams was not at all related to the specific content of the choices made. In fact, van Olffen 
(1999) found virtually no differences in strategic preferences, risk-taking or cooperative activity 
among the team types. Taken together we think that this theme of adaptation or adjustment, 
complementing issues of effective strategy implementation, should be of focal interest in future team 
research because, following Burgelman (1991), the experience and composition of teams might be a 
crucial determinant of the adaptive capacity and long-run success of organizations. Burgelman 
(1991) convincingly argued that successful companies are able to combine both efficiency and 
renewal at the same time. As locus of control is simultaneously related to goal-directed behavior 
(effective implementation) and the ability to change and adapt, team composition in terms of this trait 
might be a potential key factor in explaining differences in both the short- and long-run success of 
organizations. 
Second, Boone et al. (1998) showed that the profitability of mixed teams was very poor and 
even negative in dynamic environments. This study provides a possible explanation for this finding 
as mixed teams had the lowest planning quality in dynamic environments. We assumed that the 
remarkable bad record of mixed teams on planning quality is due to the fact that in the planning task 
the integration of various aspects of the company into joint action is crucial. This integration may 
exactly be the Achilles' heel of mixed teams as it has been shown that team heterogeneity tends to 
undermine the social cohesion among team members (Pfeffer, 1983). It is clear, however, that more 
research is needed to measure and/or observe what exactly happens in mixed versus non-mixed 
teams. Almost no research exists that opens the black box of team composition. Future research 
should focus on the processes of interpersonal interaction within teams to understand why team 
composition is related to certain outcomes. Obviously, this requires more process-oriented and 
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longitudinal research. Understanding team functioning in depth is very important for practical 
purposes because it allows one to detect the conditions under which team integration problems might 
be overcome. In this respect, it is worthwhile to investigate whether teams consisting of members 
that complement each other (i.e., mixed or heterogeneous teams) outperform any other team type 
when potential integration or cohesion problems can be solved. 
 Third, a short methodological note is warranted. As in all experimental research, 
objections as to the generalizibility of our results can be raised. We believe, however, that the 
combination of the complexity of the game design, the reward structure and the selection of 
participants by their superiors enhances the external validity of the findings, at least as far as 
decision making in (lower-level) management teams is concerned. It remains to be proven, 
however, to what extent the management teams studied inform us on the functioning of TMTs, 
the object of investigation in the upper echelons tradition. In this respect, it is, for instance, likely 
that TMTs will have more internal members on average compared to the management teams of 
the present study. This is because internality is associated with managerial effectiveness and 
consequently enhances promotion to the top. Thus, restriction in range with respect to the 
psychological composition of TMT teams, might increase the likelihood of non-findings in TMT 
settings. Note, however, that previous research reports relatively large and meaningful variation 
of locus of control scores even among CEOs (Boone et al., 1996, 2000; Miller and Toulouse, 
1986a, 1986b) and among division managers of  large Strategic Business Units (Govindarajan, 
1989), suggesting that restriction in range is not that important. Taken together, we believe that 
given  the relatively small effect sizes reported in past studies in the upper echelons tradition and the 
promising results of our illustrative experiment, this study at least points to the potential of (1) 
complementing the almost exclusive focus on strategic choice with attention for issues of strategy 
making and implementation, (2) focusing on the psychological instead of the demographic 
composition of teams, and (3) avoiding the mechanistic application of the mean and standard 
deviation to characterize different team types. This being said, the next step is of course to 
investigate whether the ideas presented in this paper survive when tested in a TMT field setting. 
This is what we actually plan to do now. 
 
 
 30 
 
References 
 
Barrick, M.R., Stewart, G.L., Neubert, M.J. and Mount, M.K. (1998), Relating member ability and 
personality to work-team processes and team effectiveness, Journal of Applied Psychology, 83: 
377-391. 
Boone, C. (1992), Research into the relationship between managers’ perception of control and 
strategy and performance of companies in the furniture industry, Antwerp: University of 
Antwerp. 
Boone, C. and De Brabander, B. (1993), Generalized versus specific locus of control 
expectancies of chief executive officers, Strategic Management Journal, 14: 619-626. 
Boone, C. and De Brabander, B. (1997), Self-reports and CEO locus of control research: a note, 
Organization Studies, 18: 949-971.  
Boone, C., De Brabander, B.. and Hellemans, J. (2000), CEO locus of control and small firm 
performance: a note, Organization Studies, 21: 641-646.. 
Boone, C., De Brabander, B., Gerits, P. and Willemé, P. (1990), Relation of scores on Rotter’s I-
E scale to short-team control expectancies and fatalism, Psychological Reports, 66: 1107-1111. 
Boone, C., De Brabander, B. and van Witteloostuijn, A. (1996), CEO locus of control and small 
firm performance: an integrative framework and empirical test, Journal of Management Studies, 
33: 667-699. 
Boone, C., van Olffen, W. and Van Witteloostuijn, A. (1998), Psychological team make-up as a 
determinant of economic firm performance - an experimental study, Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 19: 43-73. 
Burgelman, R. (1991), Intraorganizational ecology of strategy making and organizational 
adaptation: theory and field research, Organization Science, 2: 239-262. 
Carroll, G. R., and Harrison, J.R. (1998), Organizational demography and culture: insights from a 
formal model and simulation, Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 737-667. 
Chan, D. (1998), Functional relations among constructs in the same content domain at different 
levels of analysis: a typology of composition models, Journal of Applied Psychology, 83: 234-246. 
Cohen, J. and Cohen, P. (1983), Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the 
behavioral sciences, second edition, Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum publishers. 
De Brabander, B., Boone, C. and Gerits, P. (1992), Locus of control and cerebral asymmetry, 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 75: 131-143. 
Finkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D.C. (1996), Strategic leadership. Top executives and their effects 
on organizations, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company. 
Forsyth, D.R. (1990), Group Dynamics, second edition, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 
Pacific Grove: California. 
Govindarajan, V. (1989), Implementing competitive strategies at the business unit level: 
implications of matching managers to strategies, Strategic Management Journal, 10: 251-270. 
Hambrick, D.C. and Mason, P.A. (1984), Upper echelons: the organization as a refection of its 
top managers, Academy of Management Review, 9: 193-206. 
Hambrick, D.C., Geletkanycz, M.A. and Fredrickson, J.W. (1993), Top management commitment 
 31 
 
to the status quo: some tests of its determinants, Strategic Management Journal, 14: 401-418. 
Karabenick, S.A and Srull, T.K. (1978), Effects of personality and situational variation in locus 
of control on cheating: determinants of the ‘congruence effect’, Journal of Personality, 46: 72-
95. 
Katzenbach, J.R. (1993), The wisdom of teams: creating the high-performance organization, 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Katzenbach. J.R. (1998), Teams at the top: unleashing the potential of both teams and individual 
leaders, Harvard Business School Press.  
Lefcourt, H.M., Lewis, L.E. and Silverman, I.W. (1968), Internal versus external control of 
reinforcement and attention in decision making tasks, Journal of Personality, 36: 663-682. 
Lefcourt, H.M. (1982), Locus of control: current trends in theory and research, Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Lewin, K. (1948), Resolving Social Conflicts, New York: Harper & Row. 
Lewin, K. (1951), Field Theory in the Social Sciences, New York: Harper & Row. 
Lewin, A.Y. and Stephens, C.U. (1994), CEO attitudes as determinants of organization design: an 
integrate model, Organization Studies, 15: 183-212. 
Maznevski, M.L. (1994), Understanding our differences: performance in decision-making groups 
with diverse members, Human Relations, 47: 531-549. 
MCC (1994), Management Game Manual, Amsterdam: MCC International b.v.. 
McCain, B.E., O'Reilly III, C.A. and Pfeffer, J. (1983), The effect of departmental demography 
on turnover: the case of a university, Academy of Management Journal, 26: 626-641. 
Miles, R. and Snow, C.C. (1978), Organizational theory, structure and process, Tokyo: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Miller, D. (1983), The correlates of entrepreneurship in three types of firms, Management 
Science, 29: 770-791. 
Miller, D., Kets de Vries, M.R. and Toulouse, J.M. (1982), Top executive locus of control and its 
relationship to strategy-making, structure and environment, Academy of Management Journal, 
25: 237-253. 
Miller, D. and Toulouse, J.M. (1986a), Chief executive personality and corporate strategy and 
structure in small firms, Management Science, 32: 1389-1409. 
Miller, D. and Toulouse, J.M. (1986b), Strategy, structure, CEO personality and performance in 
small firms, American Journal of Small Business, 10: 47-62. 
Milliken, F.J. and Martins, L.L. (1996), Searching for common threads: understanding the 
multiple effects of diversity in organizational groups, Academy of Management Review, 21:  402- 
433. 
Murray, A.I. (1989), Top management group heterogeneity and firm performance, Strategic 
Management Journal, 10: 125-141. 
Nunnally, J.C. (1978), Psychometric theory, second edition, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Olffen van, W. (1999), Team level locus of control and competitive team behavior. An 
experimental study, Maastricht: Datawyse. 
 32 
 
Olffen van , W. and Boone, C. (1998), The confusing state of the art in top management 
composition research, NIBOR Research memorandum, Maastricht: Nibor. 
Pfeffer, J. (1983), Organizational demography, Research in Organization Behavior, 5: 299-357. 
Phares, E.J. (1976), Locus of control in personality, Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. 
Robinson, J.P. and Shaver, P.R. (1973), Measures of social psychological attitudes, Survey 
research center: Institute for Social Research. 
Rotter, J.B. (1966), Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of 
reinforcement, Psychological Monographs, entire nr. 609.  
Rotter, J.B. (1975), Some problems and misconceptions related to the construct of internal 
versus external control of reinforcement, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43: 
56-67. 
Schruijer, S.G.L. and Vansina, L. (1997), An introduction to group diversity, European Journal 
of Work and Organizational Psychology, 6: 129-138. 
Shaw, M.E. (1981), Group Dynamics: the Psychology of Small Group Behavior, third ed., New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Snow, C.C. and Hrebiniak, L.G. (1980), Strategy, distinctive competence and organizational 
performance, Administrative Science Quarterly, 25: 317-336. 
Sörensen, J. B. (1999), The ecology of organizational demography: managerial tenure distributions 
and organizational competition, Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago. 
Spector, P.E. (1982), Behavior in organizations as a function of employee’s locus of control, 
Psychological Bulletin, 91: 482-497. 
Srull, T.K. and Karabenick, S.A. (1975), Effects of personality-situation locus of control 
congruence, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32: 617-628. 
Tjosvold, D. (1991), Team organization: an enduring competitive advantage, Chicester: Wiley. 
Wagner, W.G., Pfeffer, J. and O'Reilly III, C.A. (1984), Organizational demography and turnover 
in top management groups, Administrative Science Quarterly, 29: 74-92. 
Weiss, H.M. and Adler, S. (1984), Personality and organizational behavior, Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 6: 1-50. 
Wolk, S. and DuCette, J. (1974), Intentional performance and incidental learning as a function of 
personality and task dimensions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29: 90-101. 
Zenger, T.D. and Lawrence, B.S. (1989), Organizational demography: the differential effects of 
age and tenure distributions on technical communication, Academy of Management Journal, 32: 
353-376. 
 33 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
Decision categories 
 
General decisions on… 
 
Buying of extra machines   Introduction of short time working 
Hiring extra machines    Improvement of working climate 
Buying of extra personnel   Expansion of sales force 
Hiring extra personnel    Payment of dividend    
Borrowing      Wage increases   
Redemption of borrowings   Ordering of raw materials per product 
Use of supplier credit 
 
Production and marketing decisions on… Information on… 
 
Production volumes per product  Prices, stocks, production capacities, 
Price per product    promotion outlays, product quality, sales force,  
Deployment of sales force per product working climate, market shares and wage levels  
Promotion expenditures per product  of competitors. 
Product quality R&D per product  Estimates of market demand, effectiveness of 
Efficiency R&D per product   R&D expenditures 
Length of client credit term 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Product market characteristics 
 
 
Product 
 
Market 
 
Initial demand (number of products) 
 
1 
 
A - Home 
 
100.000 
 
 
 
A - Export 
 
250.000 
 
2 
 
B - Official 
 
600.000 
 
 
 
B - “White” 
 
Unlimited 
 
3 
 
C 
 
80.000 
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APPENDIX C  
Planning quality measures 
 
Planning category Planning measure Calculation 
Capacity planning 
 
A. Average proportion of personnel capacity 
utilisation  
 
B. Average proportion of machine capacity 
utilisation  
 
C. Average proportion of forced downward 
production adjustment 
Σ (Total personnel deployed / Total personnel 
available)  /  6 
 
Σ (Total machines deployed / Total machines 
available)  / 6 
 
Σ (Volume of forced downward adjustment / Total 
planned production) / 6 
Input-Output 
planning 
 
 
 
D. Total raw materials (RM) stock rises 
 
 
E. End product (EP) stock rises 
Σ (RM end stock(t) - RM end stock(t-1)) if RM end 
stock(t)  〉  RM end stock(t-1) 
 
Σ (EP end stock(t) - EP end stock(t-1)) if EP end 
stock(t) 〉  EP end stock(t-1) 
Sales planning F. Total volume of no-sales 
 
Σ (#products demanded(t) – #Deliverable products(t)) 
if #products demanded(t)  >  #deliverable products(t) 
Financial planning G. Total cash deficit Σ (Cash outflow(t) – Cash inflow(t)) if cash outflow(t) 
> cash inflow(t) 
Overall planning  
quality 
H. Simultaneous match 
 
z(A) + z(B) + z(-C) + z(-D) + z(-E) + z(-F) + z(-G) 
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FIGURE 1 
Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
I. LEARNING HOW THE
WORLD WORKS
II. TAKING CONCERTED
ACTION
III. ADAPTATION:
CHANGING BEHAVIOR
WHEN NECESSARY
IV. ACHIEVEMENT
LEVEL
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TABLE 1 
Measuring action coherence: three hypothetical teams 
 
 
 
 
 
Team 1 
 
Team 2 
 
Team 3 
 
Strategy type 
 
Low cost  
 
High value added 
 
Incoherent 
 
Price level rank (R1) 
Promotion expenditures rank (R2) 
Quality R&D expenditures rank (R3) 
Credit facility rank (R4) 
(Efficiency expenses rank - originally) 
Efficiency expenses rank (reverse coded) 
(R5) 
 
5 
4 
4 
5 
(1) 
5 
 
1 
2 
2 
1 
(5) 
1 
 
5 
3 
1 
4 
(2) 
4 
 
(a) ΣΣ |Ri – Rj| 
(b) Action coherence (24- (a)) 
 
6 
18 
 
6 
18 
 
18 
6 
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 TABLE 2 
Descriptives 
Effective strategy implementation measures 
 
Dependent variable n Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Planning 
 
A. Personnel capacity utilization proportion 
B. Machine capacity utilization proportion 
C. Average percentage of forced downward 
production adjustment 
D. Total raw material stock rises [10.000 
units] 
E. Total end product stock rises [10.000 
units] 
F. Total no-sales [100 units] 
G. Total cash deficit [1000 ECU] 
  
H. Overall planning quality 
 
 
58 
58 
 
58 
 
58 
 
58 
58 
58 
 
58 
 
 
.82 
.96 
 
.83 
 
4.02 
 
129.16 
1208 
7247 
 
-.04 
 
 
.02 
.03 
 
1.31 
 
10.86 
 
149.04 
999 
11051 
 
4.16 
 
 
.76 
.89 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
105 
0 
 
-17.44 
 
 
.88 
.99 
 
5.30 
 
83.34 
 
1116 
4788 
57377 
 
4.38 
Consistent action 
 
A. Action coherence 
 
Home market 1 action coherence  
Export market 1 action coherence 
Market 2 action coherence 
Market 3 action coherence 
 
Overall action coherence 
 
B. Action persistence 
 
Price level rank stability 
Promotion expenses rank stability 
Efficiency expenses rank stability 
Product quality expenses rank stability 
Sales group employment rank stability 
Credit facility rank stability 
 
Overall action persistence 
 
 
 
 
58 
58 
58 
58 
 
58 
 
 
 
58 
58 
58 
58 
58 
58 
 
58 
 
 
 
 
8.74 
8.69 
9.45 
9.11 
 
9.00 
 
 
 
-1.01 
-.87 
-.73 
-.82 
-.86 
-.44 
 
-.79 
 
 
 
 
3.36 
3.37 
3.37 
3.76 
 
2.46 
 
 
 
.24 
.30 
.32 
.17 
.23 
.27 
 
.11 
 
 
 
 
2.83 
3.25 
2.17 
3.00 
 
3.63 
 
 
 
-1.55 
-1.75 
-1.29 
-1.20 
-1.30 
-.98 
 
-1.06 
 
 
 
 
14.67 
15.50 
16.50 
17.50 
 
13.42 
 
 
 
-.41 
-.23 
-.00 
-.27 
-.41 
-.00 
 
-.49 
 
 38 
 
TABLE 3 
Descriptives 
Effective strategy implementation for different team types1  
 
Environmental condition Dependent 
variable 
Team 
type Stable 
(Column 1) 
Dynamic 
(Column 2) 
All 
(Column 3) 
Overall planning 
quality 
 
 
Internal 
 
External 
 
 
Mixed 
 
.08                         2 
(3.04; 13) 
2.36                       1 
(1.31; 6) 
 
-.38                        3 
(3.76; 11) 
2.50                      1 
(1.62; 10) 
.35                        2 
(2.41; 11) 
 
-6.05                    3 
(6.91; 7) 
1.13                      1 
(2.76; 23) 
1.06                     2 
(2.27; 17) 
 
-2.58                    3 
( 5.77; 18) 
Consistent action 
 
A. Overall 
action 
coherence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Overall 
action 
persistence 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal 
 
External 
 
 
Mixed 
 
 
 
Internal 
 
External 
 
 
Mixed 
 
 
9.46                       1 
(2.50; 13) 
7.74                       3 
(2.55; 6) 
 
8.65                       2 
(2.57; 11) 
 
 
-.72                     1 
(.11; 13) 
-.87                     3 
(.11; 6) 
 
-.84                     2 
(.11; 11) 
 
 
8.45                      2 
(2.18; 10) 
10.73                    1 
(1.97; 11) 
 
7.82                      3 
(2.23; 7) 
 
 
-.79                      3 
(.11; 10) 
-.79                      2 
(.08; 11) 
 
-.76                      1 
(.14; 7) 
 
 
9.02                      2 
(2.37; 23) 
9.68                      1 
(2.58; 17) 
 
8.33                      3 
(2.41; 18) 
 
 
-.75                      1 
(.11; 23) 
-.81                      3 
(.10; 17) 
 
-.81                      2  
(.12; 18) 
1 Averages are reported. Standard deviation and number of observations are printed in parentheses. 
Rank orders are printed in bold (1 = highest planning quality / coherence /  persistence; 3 = lowest 
planning quality / coherence / persistence) 
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TABLE 4 
ANOVA  and contrast analysis results 
 
 Dependent variables 
 
 Overall planning 
quality 
Consistent action 
   A. Overall action             B. Overall action  
            coherence                                  persistence 
ANOVA factors 
 
Team type 
 
Environmental condition 
 
Interaction 
 
R2 
 
F-value1 
 
10.02 (.00) 
 
3.42 (.07) 
 
6.70 (.00) 
 
.36 
F-value1 
 
.81 (.45) 
 
.37 (.56) 
 
3.94 (.03) 
 
.17 
F-value1 
 
1.96 (.15) 
 
.99 (.32) 
 
3.22 (.05) 
 
.18 
Stable Dynamic Stable  Dynamic Stable Dynamic 
 
 
 
-2.29† 
 
 
 
1.60† 
 
 
 
 
2.15* 
 
 
 
7.48* 
 
 
 
1.72† 
 
 
 
-.05 
 
 
 
-2.29* 
 
 
 
1.77* 
 
 
 
.14** 
 
 
 
.05 
 
 
 
-.01 
 
 
 
-.03 
Environmental condition 
 
 
Main contrasts2 
 
Internal vs. External 
teams (hypotheses 1a, 1b, 
1c) 
 
Non-mixed vs. Mixed 
teams (hypotheses 2a, 2b, 
2c) 
 
Interaction contrasts 
 
Internal vs. External 
teams (hypothesis 3) 
 
Non-mixed vs. Mixed 
teams  (hypothesis 3) 
 
 
 
4.44* 
 
 
5.88** 
 
 
 
-4.01** 
 
 
1.82† 
 
 
 
-.15* 
 
 
-.08 
1 Probability of F in parentheses. Significant F-values are printed in bold. 
2 †= p < .10, *  = p < .05, **  = p < .01 (one-tailed t-test). The interaction contrasts reported are the differences 
between the respective ‘stable’ and ‘dynamic’ columns above. 
 
